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Abstract
The social investment perspective has become a prominent
topic in both social policy discussions and theoretical con-
siderations regarding welfare state change. Empirical evi-
dence on how this perspective has affected welfare state
provision is much scarcer—and sometimes contradictory.
This article aims to assess whether welfare state benefits
increasingly have incorporated elements of social invest-
ment, and what has triggered the reforms made to the ben-
efits. To achieve these aims, we examined two poverty
relief benefits in Austria, namely, unemployment assistance
and social assistance. We scrutinized changes made to
these benefits from 2000 onwards. To identify their (poten-
tially changing) contributions towards social investment, we
applied a framework that considers the economic aims of
the paradigm (while neglecting other aims). According to
this framework, a social investment benefit intends to
improve the human capital of its recipients, enhance their
employability, and/or enhance their employment integra-
tion. The findings suggest that the three elements of social
investment were particularly relevant in reforming social
assistance. However, the changes implemented were inco-
herent and do not support the hypothesis of an ever-
increasing significance of social investment. The main trig-
gers for reform were the political ideologies of (changing)
Received: 19 June 2019 Revised: 26 May 2020 Accepted: 2 July 2020
DOI: 10.1111/spol.12643
This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits use, distribution and
reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
© 2020 The Authors. Social Policy & Administration published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
Soc Policy Adm. 2020;1–16. wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/spol 1
governments. These ideologies determined the direction of
changes made to both social assistance and unemployment
assistance. If social investment thus ought to be more than
just a theoretical concept or a nonbinding policy recommen-
dation, modifications made to welfare state benefits would
need to follow a more coherent path. Regarding poor relief
benefits, Austria has not pursued such a track (yet).
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1 | INTRODUCTION
“Social investment” has become a prominent ingredient in contemporary social policy research (Bonoli, 2013;
Esping-Andersen, Gallie, Hemerijck, & Myles, 2002; Giddens, 1998; Hemerijck, 2017b; Morel, Palier, &
Palme, 2012b). It represents a “new” understanding of welfare state objectives (which is not so new after all, see, e.
g., Morel, Palier, & Palme, 2012a; Smyth & Deeming, 2016) that has been established against the background of
pressing welfare state challenges. The concept is multifaceted. It focuses, inter alia, on increasing people's, and par-
ticularly children's, human capital (Heckman, 2000; but also Lister, 2003), on enhancing the number of people in paid
employment (Bonoli, 2013; Cantillon & Vandenbroucke, 2014), and on ex ante rather than ex post social policies
(Holzmann, Sherburne-Benz, & Tesliuc, 2003). An emphasis is also on social services rather than cash transfers (Ahn
& Kim, 2015), on new social risks emerging from, inter alia, demographic changes (Taylor-Gooby, Dean, Munro, &
Parker, 1999), and—from an analytical and a policy perspective—on a life-course perspective regarding social prob-
lems and social policies (Esping-Andersen, 2002; Kvist, 2015).
The concept enjoys broad scholarly, but also political support. International institutions, including the European
Commission (2013), the OECD (2012) or the World Bank (Jenson, 2017), recommend its implementation. Some
countries have traditionally strong investment states (e.g., the Nordic welfare states, van Kersbergen & Kraft, 2017),
some have been early adapters (e.g., the Netherlands, see, e.g., Soentken, van Hooren, & Rice, 2017), some have
been lagging behind. In Austria, for example, social investment has not been discussed much (Bock-Schappelwein,
Eppel, & Mühlberger, 2009; Famira-Mühlberger, 2014; Heitzmann & Wukovitsch, 2015; Leoni, 2016), and empirical
evidence on the relevance of this paradigm in welfare state policies is scarce. Nonetheless, important features of the
social investment state have also started to play some role in this country (Leoni, 2016; Nikolai, 2012).
International organizations, including the European Commission (2013), stress that major social policy objectives
may be achieved through a social investment state. Among others, the concept is projected to allow combating pov-
erty, and particularly preventing the intergenerational transmission of poverty. This should make benefits targeted to
the poor particularly relevant in judging whether and to what extent welfare states already have implemented social
investment policies. However, while several empirical studies investigate the contributions of social investment in
combating poverty or inequality more generally (Cantillon, 2011; Rovny, 2014; Solga, 2014; Taylor-Gooby, Gumy, &
Otto, 2015; Vaalavou, 2013; Van Vliet & Wang, 2015), they usually do not focus on the contributions of poverty
relief benefits in achieving these outcomes. Rather, they analyse other social policy areas, such as labor market poli-
cies, care-related policies or education.
This article aims to examine whether reforms made to poverty relief benefits in Austria, namely, to unemploy-
ment assistance (Notstandshilfe) and social assistance (Sozialhilfe, at times called minimum income benefit, i.e.,
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Bedarfsorientierte Mindestsicherung), increasingly have considered characteristics of the social investment paradigm.
To differentiate between different elements of this paradigm, we utilize a framework (Heitzmann & Matzinger, 2018)
that suggests that benefits that attempt to (i) enhance the human capital of people, (ii) improve their “employability,”
and/or (iii) assist them in entering, reentering or remaining in paid employment qualify as social investment benefits.
In our assessment, we focus on the period from 2000 onwards—and thus the time, during which social investment
has gained momentum both politically and in terms of scholarly assessments (Esping-Andersen et al., 2002;
Giddens, 1998). We are not only interested in finding out which elements of social investment have been affected
by past reforms, but also what has triggered these reforms. Concerning the latter, both different governmental com-
positions but also external influences (such as the financial crisis of 2008/2009) are likely factors to explain changes
made to the benefits.
In what follows, we describe the research approach applied for this study. Section 3 presents the results of the
empirical investigation. Section 4 then discusses the findings and proposes future research endeavors.
2 | RESEARCH APPROACH
Despite its broad academic coverage, social investment remains an elusive concept. Most notably, decisions
on what qualifies as social investment differ in the research community. The concept is used as a synonym for
the new welfare state (Hemerijck, 2017a), but also as a description of its “productive” or “active” part (as
opposed to its “unproductive” or “passive” part, e.g., Bonoli, 2013; Giddens, 1998). However, even those who
accept this latter duality disagree on how to differentiate between active social investment and passive social
protection measures. Nolan (2013), among others, even argues that at the level of individual benefits, hardly
any intervention is not in some way “productive.” Maybe because of the concept's elusiveness, empirical evi-
dence on social investment still is relatively scarce. What's more, results of empirical investigations on the
development of social investment vary—and sometimes even contradict each other (see, e.g., Heitzmann &
Wukovitsch, 2015).
To add to conceptual clarity, which is a prerequisite for empirically studying social investment, Heitzmann and
Matzinger (2018) proposed a framework that distinguishes between three elements of social investment. According
to this framework, social policy benefits that attempt to (i) enhance the human capital of people, (ii) improve their
“employability,” and/or (iii) assist them in entering, reentering or remaining in paid employment qualify as social
investment benefits.
Enhancing human capital (Becker, 1993; Heckman, 2000, 2008) means equipping people with the appropriate
skills, capacities, competencies and knowledge for the challenges of a modern labor market (Lundvall & Lorenz, 2012).
Any intervention taken by the public sector that attempts to enhance the human capital of (future) workers, and thus
their (future) productivity, thus qualifies as social investment intervention. This makes an important rationale for
(early childhood) education and training, but also public health care as relevant policy fields for social investment. In
a broader perspective, it also comprises measures that intend to raise the social and cultural capital of (future)
workers (Bourdieu, 1992/1983).
Enhancing employability refers to individual, structural and/or normative impediments that hamper people from
accepting or remaining in (preferably highly paid and permanent) employment (Fugate, Kinicki, & Ashforth, 2004;
McQuaid & Lindsay, 2005). It thus relates to problems concerning labor supply. For example, informal caregivers
may have difficulties to remain in (or enter into) employment, if formal care facilities are missing. Legal regulations
(e.g., a mandatory state retirement age) incorporate impediments for the employment integration of some popula-
tion groups. In addition, dominant values (e.g., concerning the employment of mothers with young children) affect
the availability of potential workers for the labor market. Removing such obstacles enhances the chances of more
people to enter into (or remain in) paid employment. Consequently, such interventions contribute to social
investment.
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Even if people are well educated/trained and employable, entering or remaining in paid employment still may
be difficult to achieve due to, for example, sluggish labor demand. Consequently, welfare state benefits that focus
on labor demand and attempt to assist as many people as possible to actually enter, reenter or remain in employ-
ment qualify as contributions to social investment. For example, allowing for short-term work in times of reces-
sion keeps unemployment low. Jobs offered in the sheltered labor market or wage subsidies paid to employers
who hire low-skilled workers are further examples of measures that contribute to this element of social
investment.
By contrast to other conceptualizations, the framework of Heitzmann and Matzinger (2018), which they
developed against the background of human capital theory (Becker, 1976, 1993; Heckman, 2000), differs from
previous attempts in several ways. First, it only considers the economic aims of the paradigm (for other aims, see,
e.g., Bothfeld, 2016; Kaps, Bothfeld, Brussig, Hofmann, & Knuth, 2017; Schröder, 2012). Second, its unit of analy-
sis are single benefits rather than aggregate policy fields. Thus, instead of studying, for example, changes in active
and passive labor market policy (e.g., by comparing their expenditures), it requires examining each benefit of labor
market policy separately. Third, it focuses on the intended contributions of benefits rather than on their realized
outcomes, returns or actual impacts. This means that the design of the benefit is at the core of the analysis, and
thus its projected aim(s) and contribution(s). Fourth, it acknowledges that benefits might have both a protection
and an investment function. However, it also recognizes that it is not possible to quantify the exact magnitudes
of these two functions. Thus, the results of the analysis will be benefit-specific and hamper comparisons between
benefits.
Because of its particularities, the empirical application of the framework demands a different research approach
than employed in most research on social investment so far. Most notably, studying the design of the benefits
requires examining the (specified) aims, eligibility criteria (including the conditions under which benefits are not
granted any longer), the type of assistance provided (e.g., cash or in-kind transfers, services, regulations), or the
modes of delivery (e.g., at national, regional or local level; amount of discretion in decision-making). Obviously, one
indicator that holds sufficient information on all of these different dimensions does not exist. Rather, different types
of data need to be taken into consideration. This makes an empirical exercise quite extensive and its results rather
idiosyncratic. The latter clearly hampers comparing social investment contributions between benefits, let alone
between countries. Table 1 suggests some guiding questions that may help in detecting relevant information on the
contributions of benefits to the three elements of social investment.
In terms of information needs, both federal and national legislations are vital information sources on the design
of individual benefits—and a document analysis of these sources the principal research method applied. Given the
emphasis of this article on changes made to the benefits over time, the analysis focused not only on current regula-
tions, but also on the revisions made to the legal framework from 2000 onwards. In addition to information on the
specific regulations, scientific assessments of the benefits (and changes thereof over time) were valuable information
sources. This type of literature enabled capturing information on both the reasons that led to the reforms of the ben-
efits and the (expected or realized) impacts of the benefits in question.
Information for the empirical analysis derives from an extensive literature review, including a document analysis
of gray articles, reports, and legal regulations. For the analysis of unemployment assistance, the relevant law was
scrutinized for the period between 2000 and 2019 (https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/). Data on changes made to the bene-
fit also derived from official reports, for example, by the Ministry of Social Affairs (BMASGK, 2018a; 2018b; 2019;
BMASK, 2017) or the public employment service (PES; Arbeitsmarktservice Österreich, 2001, 2006, 2011, 2015,
2016, 2018).
Information on social assistance derived from the relevant legislations (https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/). Given that
the benefit is in the jurisdiction of the nine federal provinces rather than the nation state, information on this benefit
has been more limited at the level of national institutions. The Ministry of Social Affairs, however, did commission
some evaluation reports on minimum income benefit.1 The Austrian statistical office is in charge of regularly publish-
ing information on these benefits, including data on expenditures or the number and composition of the recipients
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(Pratscher, 2012, 2019). Some provinces, including Vienna, annually publish data on the benefit (https://www.wien.
gv.at/kontakte/ma40/downloads.html). Some (mostly regional) evaluation studies complement the main information
sources utilized for the analysis of this transfer (Bergmann, Riesenfelder, & Sorger, 2012; Bock-Schappelwein, 2004;
Bock-Schappelwein et al., 2016; Riesenfelder, Bergmann, Sorger, & Danzer, 2014). If not mentioned otherwise, infor-
mation on the benefits in the following sections derives from these sources.
3 | RESULTS
In what follows, we illustrate changes made to two poverty relief benefits in Austria within the last two
decades (2000–2019). This enables us to see which elements of social investment, if any, have changed over
time. We also provide information on the reasons for these amendments. This allows us to identify what has
caused them.
We start by providing some background information on the role of the two poor relief benefits examined,
namely, unemployment assistance and social assistance.2 We describe the (changing) circumstances within the
period studied, as they might provide important rationales for reforming the benefits. Then we proceed with a
detailed analysis of the reforms implemented with regard to each of the two benefits in question.
TABLE 1 List of questions to guide the detection of potential indicators for the three elements of social
investment
Elements of social
investment Focus Guiding questions
Human capital
development
Enhancing knowledge, skills and
competencies of people
Is human capital formation or development
an explicit target of the benefit? Does
eligibility to the benefit depend on human
capital formation or development? Does
the type of assistance and/or the modes
of delivery positively influence human
capital development? Is eligibility to the
benefit a requirement to be eligible for
other measures enhancing human capital?
Employability Removing individual, structural, and
normative barriers that hamper people
from entering (or remaining in)
employment (supply side perspective of
the labor market)
Is enhancing employability an explicit target
of the benefit? Do eligibility criteria
require potential recipients to enhance
their employability? Does the type of
assistance and/or the modes of delivery
positively influence employability? Is
eligibility to the benefit a requirement to
be eligible for other measures enhancing
employability?
Employment
integration
Maintaining or enhancing the number of
people in employment (demand-side
perspective of the labor market)
Is employment integration an explicit target
of the benefit? Do eligibility criteria
require potential recipients to remain in or
enter employment? Does the type of
assistance and/or the modes of delivery
positively influence employment
integration? Is eligibility to the benefit a
requirement to be eligible for other
measures that assist recipients in entering
or remaining in employment?
Source: Own illustration; based on Heitzmann and Matzinger (2018).
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3.1 | Setting the scene: Unemployment assistance and social assistance in times of
multiple changes of government coalitions and a variety of socioeconomic challenges
Unemployment assistance and social assistance form part of the so-called third pillar of the Austrian welfare state
(alongside the first pillar, i.e., insurance benefits, and the second pillar, i.e., universal benefits). The third pillar includes
all means-tested and subsidiary benefits granted in case of need (BMASK, 2016a). Overall, expenditures for this pillar
only account for some 10% of total social security spending (BMASGK, 2018b, p. 42). Social assistance and unem-
ployment assistance are, together with equalization supplement3 (Ausgleichszulage), the largest of these benefits. In
2018, social assistance has been granted to some 290.000 people (Pratscher, 2019, p. 851), that is, 3.3% of the total
population in Austria. Unemployment assistance has been delivered to an average of 143.000 persons
(Arbeitsmarktservice Österreich, 2019, p. 26), or 2.6% of the population in working age (20–64 years). People in
need, whose unemployment benefit has expired, may be entitled to unemployment assistance. Social assistance is
available to all citizens in need, regardless of previous employment records. Concerning their composition, studies
suggest that recipients of social assistance are more heterogeneous than those of unemployment assistance
(Bergmann et al., 2012, p. 8ff). Many of the former face multiple problems. While those in working-age are in princi-
ple able to work, many are not immediately job-ready (Bergmann et al., 2012; Bock-Schappelwein et al., 2016,
p. 37ff).
Regarding welfare state development in Austria more generally, Österle and Heitzmann (2020) differentiate
between three reform periods from 2000 onwards. These sequences, whilst influenced by socioeconomic factors,
political developments and dominant ideas, correlate highly with changes in coalition governments. During the first
period, between 2000 and 2006, several center-right coalitions of the conservative People's Party (ÖVP) and the
right-wing Freedom Party (FPÖ/BZÖ) governed Austria. The ÖVP emphasized changes of structural rigidities and
favored privatization. At the center of the FPÖ agenda was the issue of immigration. During the second period,
between 2007 and 2017, center-left coalitions between the Social-Democratic Party (SPÖ) and the ÖVP formed
the government. In socioeconomic terms, both, the global financial crisis from 2008/2009 and a large inflow of ref-
ugees in 2015, marked this period. In 2018, Austria moved into a third period with the return of the coalition
between the ÖVP and the FPÖ. This government—and thus the third period—ended prematurely in 2019, after a
political scandal involving the leader of the FPÖ. For 7 months, the federal president installed an expert cabinet,
which—after general elections—was replaced by a center-left government consisting of the ÖVP and the Green
Party in 2020.
3.2 | Reforming unemployment assistance: Between reduced entitlements and
increased protection
Overall, changes made to unemployment assistance coincide with the reform sequences suggested by Österle and
Heitzmann (2020). During the first period, when center-right governments were in power between 2000 and 2006,
changes implemented led to both a reduction of the average benefit level and a tightening of eligibility criteria.4 For
example, family supplements were reduced, replacement rates were lowered, eligibility to the benefit was limited to
people who were looking for a job for at least 20 hours per week,5 qualifying periods were extended and sanctions
aggravated (Fink, 2019; Obinger & Tálos, 2010). In addition, pressures to reenter quickly into paid employment were
enhanced (Atzmüller, 2009). The government implemented all of these changes with the objective to reduce social
expenditures and to enhance employment integration, particularly of the long-term unemployed. In terms of the
three elements of social investment, the reforms implemented only relate to the objective of employment integra-
tion. However, the measures taken enhanced work incentives for benefit recipients (Fink, 2019, p. 223f). They qual-
ify as “incentive reinforcement” (Bonoli, 2012, p. 184). Whether these workfare-like measures qualify as social
investment largely depends on how one defines the latter (Bonoli, 2012, p. 185).
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When the grand coalition of SPÖ and ÖVP came into power in 2007, the second period of welfare state change
started. This time, eligibility to benefits from unemployment insurance was extended to cover different groups of
the self-employed (BMASGK, 2019, p. 43f). Moreover, the long-term unemployed, who were not entitled to unem-
ployment assistance due to high incomes of their partner, have been covered by health insurance (BMASGK, 2019,
p. 40). With the introduction of minimum income benefit from 2010 onwards (see below), further reforms affected
the level of the benefit—thereby strengthening its minimum income element (BMASK, 2016b). For example, the
reduction of unemployment assistance due to the high income of one's partner was limited to the level of minimum
income benefit established for couples. With this and other changes, therefore, the protection (rather than the
investment) element of unemployment assistance has been at the core of the reforms—with hardly any further rele-
vance concerning the three elements of social investment.
In the third period (2018–2019), the center-right government planned to abolish unemployment assistance and
to merge it with social assistance (Neue Volkspartei & Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs, 2017). This would have signi-
fied the start of a third period of reforms regarding unemployment assistance. However, due to the premature termi-
nation of the government coalition, this plan was not realized.6
To sum up, changes in the regulations concerning unemployment assistance have not undergone major reforms
that would qualify as a deliberate turn towards more social investment. Eligibility to the benefit was linked more
closely to the obligation to enter into paid employment in the first period of reform, thus touching upon this element
of social investment—even though the measures applied do not necessarily qualify as social investment. Reforms of
the second period targeted the benefit level of low-income groups and extended benefit coverage to the self-
employed. These changes enhanced the protection function of the benefit. Both types of reforms were the result of
(different) political ideologies of center-right and center-left governments, rather than a response to the social
investment discourse, which indeed does not appear to have played any role with regard to changes made to unem-
ployment assistance in the past.
3.3 | Reforming social assistance: From social assistance to minimum income benefit
and back
Between 2000 and 2019, we can distinguish three periods of social assistance legislation in Austria—which corre-
spond only in part with the general sequence of welfare state change mentioned previously (Österle &
Heitzmann, 2020). The beginning of the first period already dates back to the 1970s (Melinz, 1989). Then, each of
the nine Austrian provinces implemented different laws on social assistance (Dimmel et al., 1989; Pfeil, 2001). They
all relied on similar principles, for example, concerning subsidiarity, work obligations or discretion as the principle
mode of decision-making. However, they also differed substantially, for example, in terms of benefit levels or the
generosity, with which they were granted (Otter & Pfeil, 2011; Stelzer-Orthofer, 2011). Not least due to these
regional differences, the national governments undertook several attempts to harmonize the nine laws. They were
only successful in this endeavor in 2010, because of a joint effort of both the national and the regional governments.
2010 thus marks the beginning of the second period of social assistance legislation. Interestingly, the reform was
implemented despite the deteriorated economic environment due to the global financial and the subsequent fiscal
crisis in Austria—not least as different national and regional actors have prepared the reform for several years and
did not want to postpone the reform any longer. Based on an agreement between the national and regional govern-
ments (Dimmel & Pratscher, 2014), the provinces harmonized eligibility criteria and minimum levels of the benefit,
which was called minimum income benefit henceforth. Despite harmonization, regional differences prevailed, partic-
ularly due to decision-making by discretion (see, e.g., Leibetseder, 2015). The state-provinces' agreement on mini-
mum income benefit expired by the end of 2016. While the national government wanted its prolongation, the large
numbers of refugees that entered Austria in 2015 put enormous pressure on the federal budgets. Notions of
“deservingness” started to dominate the public debate on minimum income benefit, particularly regarding
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beneficiaries with a migrant background (Österle & Heitzmann, 2020). The federal provinces, consisting of govern-
ments in which either the social democrats or the conservatives were in power, disagreed on how to deal with these
new challenges and the changed attitudes of the population towards the refugee crisis. They thus allowed the agree-
ment to expire. From 2017 onwards, therefore, the regional laws started to diverge again, leading to a third period of
social assistance legislation. Some provinces, such as Upper Austria, started to grant lower benefits to people with a
migrant background. Others introduced maximum benefit levels for larger households and/or excluded citizens that
had not been living in Austria for the past 5 years (e.g., Lower Austria). The courts, including the European Court of
Justice, have repealed several of these regulations since.7 In 2019, the then center-right government wanted to har-
monize the benefit again. This time, it forwarded a national law on social assistance (thereby also reinstating the old
notion of the benefit). The government copied the more restrictive regulations of some of the provinces (most nota-
bly of Upper and Lower Austria). For example, the law established maximum (rather than minimum) benefit levels
and lower benefits for people with insufficient language skills. The provinces were required to adopt their regional
laws according to the new national legislation up until 2020. Meanwhile, however, the Austrian Constitutional Court
has repealed some of this new legislation on social assistance.8 As the ÖVP-FPÖ coalition is no longer in power, it is
not yet (May 2020) clear, how the current coalition government and/or the provinces will proceed.
In the following, we summarize the intended contributions of social assistance/minimum income benefit to
the three elements of social investment for each of the different periods of legislation. As the federal laws often
diverge from each other, we focus specifically on the province of Vienna, as more than half of all beneficiaries of
social assistance/minimum income benefit resided in the capital city during the last two decades (Pratscher, 2012,
2019).
3.3.1 | Human capital development
During the first period of social assistance legislation (1970s–2010), there was hardly any focus on human capital
development. Most of the federal laws included a general stipulation, according to which general counseling and sup-
port might be provided. However, it was left to the discretion of the civil servants at the local level, whether this type
of support was delivered.
During the second period (2010–2016), minimum income benefit included a stipulation, which required benefi-
ciaries that were fit to work to enter into employment or to engage in qualification programs. The latter condition
clearly refers to human capital development. In comparison to the first period, moreover, there was a more explicit
emphasis on labor market (re)integration—and an alignment of important notions (e.g., on the availability for and the
willingness to work) with the regulations in unemployment insurance (Leibetseder & Woltran, 2011;
Weißensteiner, 2011). Most notably, recipients of minimum income benefit became an explicit target group of the
PES—and were obliged to register with this labor market organization (Arbeitsmarktservice Österreich, 2013). In
2016, 45% of all recipients of minimum income benefit were registered with the PES, even though they were not
entitled to insurance benefits (Arbeitsmarktservice Österreich, 2017, p. 23). Between 2012 and 2016, their propor-
tion increased by 50%. PES expenditures for this group, which particularly consumed active labor market programs,
even enhanced by almost 70%, suggesting an increase in spending per capita. Mitter (2011) shows that the closer
link to the PES indeed inspired beneficiaries of minimum income benefit. More than 80% suggested that they
benefitted from the closer connections with the PES. A further improvement of the minimum income laws referred
to the full inclusion of all beneficiaries in public health insurance (Weißensteiner, 2011). Prior to 2010, recipients of
social assistance had to apply for specific certificates to consume health services. This was considered as stigmatizing
and added to the non-take-up of health services (Fuchs, 2009; Fuchs, Schmied, & Oberzaucher, 2003;
Weißensteiner, 2011). Having obtained full and equal access to health services ought to have positive repercussions
on human capital per se. The policy change thus may be considered as an additional contribution to this element of
social investment.
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After the state-provinces' agreement on minimum income benefit expired by the end of 2016, the laws of the
provinces started to diverge again—and the third period of social assistance legislation started. Vienna only adopted
a revised legislation in 2018. Contrary to many other provinces, the capital city, which was governed by a coalition
of the Social-democratic Party and the Green Party, decided to enhance its focus on human capital development.
For example, the law required beneficiaries to participate in basic education offers, in courses that prepare people to
enter into higher education or qualification programs. A specific focus was set on young adults below the age of 25.
If they had not obtained a professional qualification, they had to be included in a respective measure. Thus, rather
than a “work-first approach”, a “qualification-first approach” was adopted, at least for younger adults—hence enhanc-
ing the contribution of the benefit to human capital development.
The national law on social assistance that ought to be implemented in 2020 would have put the rather generous
stipulations in Vienna on a hold. The most recent regulation no longer refers to human capital development. Rather,
people not having concluded compulsory education in Austria or that do not obtain over sufficient German or
English language skills only qualify for a reduced cash transfer. Even though the provinces are required to offer in-
kind support for these beneficiaries in order to help them achieve the necessary qualifications, they are not obliged
to do so, nor do (potential) beneficiaries have a right (or an obligation) to attend such programs. Hence, low levels of
benefits serve as incentives to engage in human capital development, which, however, is regarded as a private
responsibility of the poor. Compared with the previous legislation on minimum income benefit in Vienna, this would
clearly signify a decrease concerning public efforts in developing human capital. As mentioned earlier, the Austrian
Constitutional Court has repealed parts of this national law on social assistance since. The current government has
not yet taken steps to adjust the legislation—and Vienna has not yet implemented the national law.
3.3.2 | Enhancing employability
In terms of employability, social assistance legislation in Vienna did not focus on this issue during the first period,
and thus up until 2010—with the exception of the above-mentioned general stipulation to provide counseling and
support. A similar stipulation was included in the laws on minimum income benefit implemented after 2010, and
thus during the second period. In addition, and as mentioned above, the legislation required recipients of the bene-
fit to register with the PES and to utilize its services, which also included programs to enhance employability
(Arbeitsmarktservice Österreich, 2019). In 2018, the Viennese law on minimum income benefit was revised. It
explicitly stated that beneficiaries that are fit for work had to participate in programs that attempt to enhance
employability. It thus introduced a key notion of the social investment discourse. Not least against the background
of increased numbers of refugees in Vienna, beneficiaries with a migrant background were required to participate
in programs that helped to identify their competences and work-related skills for the Austrian labor market—with
likely benefits to their employability. Furthermore, the poor were required to attend programs on activation, orien-
tation, counseling, coaching, or integration; thus another focus on impediments to employment. The law also intro-
duced a case management approach for people not fit for work. They were required to attend rehabilitation or
employment programs. For adults under the age of 25, the revised Viennese legislation stipulated that assistance
through social work or psychosocial counseling ought to be provided. This yet again confirms that there has been a
focus not only on qualifying people (and thus developing their human capital), but also on reducing hurdles to
employment more generally (thus enhancing employability). This is also referred to in one of the targets of the
revised legislation. It stipulates that beneficiaries in working age ought to be integrated (or reintegrated) sustainably
into the labor market. Thus, the long-term inclusion into paid employment was established as an explicit aim of the
benefit.
Due to the requirement of implementing a new legislation, minimum income benefit was destined to become
social assistance benefit again from 2020 onwards. In this most recent legislation, there is no longer a focus on
employability. Rather, being employable has been constructed as an eligibility criterion to qualify for the full benefit.
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This suggests that the revised benefit—which, however, has not been adopted so far by most federal provinces—yet
again would focus on a work-first approach.
3.3.3 | Enhancing employment integration
In terms of employment integration, the first period of social assistance legislation clearly focused on a work-first
approach. While it referred to empowerment (by requiring that civil servants provide that type of assistance that ulti-
mately makes the beneficiary independent from this benefit: this could involve qualification programs but also sup-
port regarding child care obligations), (fast) employment (re)integration was key. This is evidenced by the stipulation
that beneficiaries that are fit to work ought to accept jobs below their qualification. Also in the second and third
period, when social assistance became minimum income benefit, the main objective remained employment integra-
tion. However, the emphasis was shifted towards sustainable or continuous employment integration (which often
necessitates qualification first). As mentioned above, beneficiaries that were fit to work had to register with the PES
from the second period onwards. Several of the programs offered by this labor market organizations assist people in
entering employment by enhancing labor demand (e.g., by paying subsidies to employers who employ long-term
unemployed people or by offering jobs in the sheltered labor market). These (and other) measures (see, e.g.,
Arbeitsmarktservice Österreich, 2019) thus aimed at enhancing employment integration—with potential positive
repercussions on human capital development as well. With the most recent Austrian social assistance law, the work-
first approach has been strengthened. By contrast to the two previous periods, however, sustainable or continuous
employment integration is no longer mentioned as a key target. Rather, the relevant objective is employment inte-
gration per se.
The assessment of the different periods of legislating social assistance/minimum income benefit between 2000
and 2019 suggests that there has been an increasing awareness of and an increased focus on human capital develop-
ment and employability, however, only until the end of the third period (at least in Vienna9). In the most recent
national legislation, these social investment elements do not appear to play a significant role any longer. Rather,
human capital development and employability are rendered as individual responsibilities, and constructed as neces-
sary conditions to qualify for the full level of the benefit. Meanwhile, the Austrian Constitutional Court has repealed
this requirement for migrants, who do not obtain over a sufficient knowledge of the German language, though. It is
not yet clear whether and how the current government will adjust the legislation. Most provinces, therefore, did not
yet implement the national law on social assistance.
4 | DISCUSSION
This article set out to examine whether reforms made to the design of poverty relief benefits in Austria during the
past two decades increasingly have considered elements of social investment. We examined two Austrian benefits,
one provided for the income poor in general (social assistance/minimum income benefit), and the other one provided
for the long-term unemployed particularly (unemployment assistance). We were interested in finding out which ele-
ments of social investment, if any, have been affected by the reforms, and what has triggered the reforms of the ben-
efits over time. In studying the contributions to social investment, we utilized a framework that only considers the
economic aims of the paradigm, though, namely, human capital development and an enhancement of both employ-
ability and employment integration.
The results of the assessment suggest that despite being means-tested and (mostly) cash transfers, both benefits
touch upon the elements of social investment, albeit to very different degrees (see Figure 1). Regarding unemploy-
ment assistance, employment integration was and is a key target. However, the measures applied to achieve this tar-
get resemble workfare rather than social investment. What's more, neither human capital development nor
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employability played or play a considerable role in the design of this benefit over time. There has been a tightening
of eligibility criteria during the center-right governments at the beginning (2000–2007) and the end (2018–2019) of
the period analyzed. During the period, in which center-left governments were in power (2007–2017), there was a
strengthening of minimum income elements (and thus the protection function of the benefit). As may be derived
from these developments, the changes made to the benefits were largely the result of changing political ideologies
due to changing government coalitions.
Regarding social assistance/minimum income benefit, the results suggest that all three social investment ele-
ments have gained in importance between 2010 and 2016, after a harmonized regulation on minimum income bene-
fit has been implemented in all nine Austrian provinces. Prior to 2010, the benefit, which is a legal competence of
the Austrian Länder rather than the nation state, differed vastly between the provinces. From 2017 onwards, the
routes of policy adaptation started to diverge again. Only some provinces, most notably Vienna, continued to imple-
ment reforms that are in line with the proposals of the social investment perspective. The law on social assistance
that was passed by the national government in 2019 would have harmonized the benefit again. However, it would
also have reversed the significance of social investment regarding this benefit. The Austrian Constitutional Court has
repealed some of this most recent legislation, though. It is not clear yet (May 2020), how the center-left government
in power will proceed. It might well be that it renounces to legislate social assistance at the national level and shifts
the legal competence back to the federal provinces.
By contrast to unemployment benefit, the reasons for reforming social assistance have been more multi-faceted.
In the first decade of the new millennium, the nine regional governments decided quite autonomously, how to design
“their” social assistance benefits—with large variations between them. Due to a joint effort of both national and
regional governments, minimum income benefit was harmonized from 2010 onwards. Interestingly, the benefit—
which was in most provinces more favorable than compared with the previous social assistance benefits—was
implemented despite rising socioeconomic challenges after the financial crisis had also hit Austria. It appears that the
joint political effort thus has been stronger than the deteriorated socioeconomic environment. After the agreement
between the nation state and the federal provinces expired in 2016, it has not been possible to prolong it. The prov-
inces disagreed on how to proceed with the problems related to the refugee crisis of 2015. Therefore, different
PERIODS OF GOVERNMENT COALITIONS 
2000 – 2006 
ÖVP-FPÖ/BZÖ coalitions (center-right) 
2007 – 2017 
SPÖ – ÖVP coalitions (center-left) 
2018 – 2019
ÖVP-FPÖ 
coalition 
(center-
right) 
UNEMPLOYMENT ASSISTANCE 
2000 -2006 
Employment integration through incentive 
reinforcement: rather workfare than social 
investment (?) 
2007 – 2017 
Policy focus on protection rather than investment function 
2018 – 2019
Plan to 
abolish the 
benefit (not 
executed) 
SOCIAL ASSISTANCE 
2000 – 2010 
Different stipulations in the Austrian Länder 
 
Generally: no explicit focus on human capital development or employability; 
employment integration through incentive reinforcement: rather workfare than 
social investment  
2011-2016 
Harmonized legislation  
 
Systematic focus on human capital 
development, employability and 
employment integration 
2017 – 2019 
Different 
stipulations in the 
Austrian Länder 
 
Vienna: enhanced 
focus on human 
capital development 
and employability of 
specific groups 
2000 2019
F IGURE 1 Sequences of policy reforms, Austria 2000–2019.
Source: Own illustration
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political coalitions at the level of the Austrian Länder led to different laws on social assistance. Thus, the political
responses to the refugee crisis at the level of the Länder outweighed the advantage of having a harmonized benefit
for the poor throughout Austria. Only in 2019 did the national government introduce a regulation to harmonize the
benefit again. This time, however, it forwarded a very restrictive law on social assistance, thereby adhering to the
political ideologies of the then center-right national government.
Having studied the direction of changes made to the two poor relief benefits during the last two decades in Aus-
tria, the findings do not suggest a gradual realization of a social investment agenda (or, for that matter, any other
long-term strategy). Rather, political ideologies that are inherent in the politics of middle-right or middle-left govern-
ments appear to have been the guiding principles of the reforms (at both the national and the regional levels). This
has, for example, been the case with unemployment assistance, where different political objectives (work-first and
activation vs. income security) led to different types of reforms over time. This has also been the case with regard to
social assistance. After having introduced different elements of social investment from 2010 onwards, the most
recent regulation—if implemented—would have signified an abandoning of many of these elements. Consequently,
there is no evidence of a systematic consideration of social investment in developing poverty relief benefits in Aus-
tria within the past two decades—at least with regard to the economic aims of the paradigm. If this concept thus
ought to be more than just a theoretical idea or a nonbinding policy recommendation, reforms would need to follow
a systematic path—regardless of changes in governments and thus political ideologies.
In assessing the two poverty relief benefits, it has been possible to see that many more measures are targeted
to or relevant for the recipients of both social assistance and unemployment benefit. Most notably, eligibility to both
benefits depends upon utilizing programs offered by the PES. Within the last two decades, the very supply of this
institution has changed—with an increasing focus on programs to develop the human capital of the beneficiaries, to
enhance their employability, and to allow for (subsidized) forms of employment integration (BMASGK, 2019;
2018a). In addition, many other social policies are relevant for the population in general, including the poor. For
example, Austrian family policy has been amended in the past two decades, inter alia by providing more incentives
for fathers to take on parental leave or by expanding childcare facilities (Blum, 2010; Blum, Formankova, & Dobr-
otic, 2014; Dearing, 2016). These changes affect important impediments for mothers to remain in or enter employ-
ment. These and many other measures are available for all citizens, including the poor. As combating poverty and
particularly preventing the intergenerational transmission of poverty is one of the—uncontested—normative targets
of social investment, it might be a promising future research endeavor to examine more social policy measures—and
their contributions to social investment—that are (also) available to the poor. The framework applied in this exercise
could be helpful in conducting this type of research.
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ENDNOTES
1 https://www.sozialministerium.at/site/Service_Medien/Infomaterial/Downloads/?category1=value_13
2 “Social assistance” was called “minimum income benefit” in the legislation from 2010 onwards. Only in the most recent
national law, the notion of “social assistance” was installed again. In this article, we use the term “social assistance” as the
general notion for this poor relief benefit.
3 Equalization supplement accrues to people who are eligible for a retirement pension, but whose social insurance-based
pension does not achieve a certain threshold. As it targets people that are no longer available for the labor market, we
abstained from including this benefit in our analysis.
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4 For more information on the specific stipulations during the different periods, also with regard to social assistance, please
consult the MISSOC-Homepage: https://www.missoc.org/missoc-database/comparative-tables/.
5 In case of caring responsibilities, this requirement was reduced to a minimum working time of 16 hours per week.
6 Interestingly, already the first center-right coalition government, established in 2000, planned to abolish unemployment
assistance and to merge it with social assistance. However, this plan had not been realized then (Fink, 2019, p. 217f).
7 See, for example, the decisions of the Austrian Constitutional Court, VfGH 136/2017-19; VfGH 308/2018-8.
8 See the decisions of the Austrian Constitutional Court, VfGH 164/2019; 171/2019-24.
9 In other provinces (e.g., in Upper Austria and Lower Austria, in which the governors both were affiliated with the ÖVP),
this focus already was reversed after the second period, that is, after the agreement on minimum income benefit between
the national and regional governments expired by the end of the 2016.
REFERENCES
Ahn, S.-H., & Kim, S.-W. (2015). Social investment, social service and the economic performance of welfare states. Interna-
tional Journal of Social Welfare, 24(2), 109–119. https://doi.org/10.1111/ijsw.12094
Arbeitsmarktservice Österreich. (2001). Geschäftsbericht 2000. Wien: AMS.
Arbeitsmarktservice Österreich. (2006). Geschäftsbericht 2005. Wien: AMS.
Arbeitsmarktservice Österreich. (2011). Geschäftsbericht 2010. Wien: AMS.
Arbeitsmarktservice Österreich. (2013). Geschäftsbericht 2012. Wien: AMS.
Arbeitsmarktservice Österreich. (2015). Spezialthema zum Arbeitsmarkt. Langzeitarbeitslosigkeit und Langzeitbeschäftigungslosigkeit.
Retrieved from https://www.ams.at/content/dam/dokumente/berichte/001_spezialthema_1115.pdf
Arbeitsmarktservice Österreich. (2016). Geschäftsbericht 2015. Wien: AMS.
Arbeitsmarktservice Österreich. (2017). Geschäftsbericht 2016. Wien: AMS.
Arbeitsmarktservice Österreich. (2018). AMS Geschäftsbericht 2017: Trendwende am Arbeitmarkt. Wien: AMS.
Arbeitsmarktservice Österreich. (2019). Geschäftsbericht 2018: Richtig viel Arbeit. Wien: AMS.
Atzmüller, R. (2009). Die Entwicklung der Arbeitsmarktpolitik in Österreich: Dimensionen von Workfare in der
österreichischen Sozialpolitik. Kurswechsel, 2009(4), 24–34.
Becker, G. S. (1976). The economic approach to human behavior. Chicago, London: The University of Chicago Press.
Becker, G. S. (1993). Human capital: A theoretical and empirical analysis with special reference to education (3rd ed.). Chicago,
London: The University of Chicago Press.
Bergmann, N., Riesenfelder, A., & Sorger, C. (2012). Auswirkungen der Bedarfsorientierten Mindestsicherung auf die Wie-
dereingliederung der LeistungsbezieherInnen ins Erwerbsleben. Wien: L & R Sozialforschung.
Blum, S. (2010). Between instrument tinkering and policy re-newal. Reforms of parental leave in Germany and Austria. Ger-
man Policy Studies, 6(3), 83–118.
Blum, S., Formankova, L., & Dobrotic, I. (2014). Family policies in ‘hybrid’ welfare states after the crisis: Pathways between
policy expansion and retrenchment. Social Policy & Administration, 48(4), 468–491. https://doi.org/10.1111/spol.12071
BMASGK. (2018a). Aktive Arbeitsmarktpolitik in Österreich 2014–2018. Retrieved from https://www.sozialministerium.at/
site/Service_Medien/Infomaterial/Downloads/Aktive_Arbeitsmarktpolitik_in_Oesterreich_2014_bis_2018_
Dokumentation
BMASGK. (2018b). Sozialstaat Österreich: Leistungen, Ausgaben und Finanzierung 2018. Retrieved from https://www.
sozialministerium.at/site/Service_Medien/News_Veranstaltungen/News/Sozialstaat_Oesterreich_Leistungen_
Ausgaben_und_Finanzierung_2018
BMASGK. (2019). Dokumentation - Legistische Änderungen in der österreichischen Arbeitsmarktpolitik 1998–2019. Retrieved from
https://www.sozialministerium.at/site/Service_Medien/Infomaterial/Downloads/Dokumentation_legistische_Aenderungen_
in_der_oesterreichischen_Arbeitsmarktpolitik_1998_2019
BMASK. (2016a). The Austrian Welfare State. Benefits, expenditure and financing 2016. Wien: Bundesministerium für Arbeit,
Soziales und Konsumentenschutz.
BMASK. (2016b). Sozialstaat Österreich. Leistungen, Ausgaben, Finanzierung 2016. Wien: Bundesministerium für Arbeit,
Soziales und Konsumentenschutz.
BMASK. (2017). Sozialbericht: Sozialpolitische Entwicklungen und Maßnahmen 2015–2016. Sozialpolitische Analysen. Wien:
Bundesministerium für Arbeit, Soziales und Konsumentenschutz.
Bock-Schappelwein, J. (2004). Arbeitslosigkeit und offene Sozialhilfe in Österreich: Eine quantitative Analyse. Wien: WIFO.
Bock-Schappelwein, J., Eppel, R., Fuchs, S., Horvath, T., Huemer, U., Lutz, H., & Mahringer, H. (2016). Entwicklung der
Bedarfsorientierten Mindestsicherung und deren Einflussfaktoren in Wien. Wien: WIFO.
Bock-Schappelwein, J., Eppel, R., & Mühlberger, U. (2009). Sozialpolitik als Produktivkraft. Wien: WIFO.
HEITZMANN AND MATZINGER 13
Bonoli, G. (2012). Active labour market policy and social investment: A changing relationship. In N. Morel, B. Palier, & J.
Palme (Eds.), Towards a social investment state? Ideas, policies and challenges (pp. 181–204). Bristol: Polity Press.
Bonoli, G. (2013). The origins of active social policy: Labour market and childcare policies in a comparative perspective. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Bothfeld, S. (2016). Social Investment - Impuls für eine moderen Sozialpolitik? WISO direkt, 23/2016.
Bourdieu, P. (1992/1983). Ökonomisches Kapital - Kulturelles Kapital - Soziales Kapital. In M. Steinrücke (Ed.), Pierre
Bourdieu: Die verborgenen Mechanismen der Macht (pp. 49–79). Hamburg: VSA-Verlag.
Cantillon, B. (2011). The paradox of the social investment state: Growth, employment and poverty in the Lisbon era. Journal
of European Social Policy, 21(5), 432–449. https://doi.org/10.1177/0958928711418856
Cantillon, B., & Vandenbroucke, F. (Eds.). (2014). Reconciling work and poverty reduction: How successful are European welfare
states? Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Dearing, H. (2016). Gender equality in the division of work: How to assess European leave policies regarding their compli-
ance with an ideal leave model. Journal of European Social Policy, 26(3), 234–247. https://doi.org/10.1177/
0958928716642951
Dimmel, N., Gahleitner, S., Köppl, F., Melinz, G., Pfeil, W., Steiner, H., & Ziniel, G. (Eds.). (1989). Sozialhilfe: Strukturen, Mängel,
Vorschläge. Wien: AK Wien.
Dimmel, N., & Pratscher, K. (2014). Bedarfsorientierte Mindestsicherung (BMS) - eine Zwischenbilanz. In N. Dimmel, M.
Schenk, & C. Stelzer-Orthofer (Eds.), Handbuch Armut in Österreich (pp. 944–976). Innsbruck: Studienverlag.
Esping-Andersen, G. (2002). Towards the good society. Once again? In G. Esping-Andersen, D. Gallie, A. Hemerijck, & J.
Myles (Eds.), Why we need a new welfare state (pp. 1–25). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Esping-Andersen, G., Gallie, D., Hemerijck, A., & Myles, J. (2002). Why we need a new welfare state. Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press.
European Commission. (2013). Communication from the commission to the European Parliament, the council, the European eco-
nomic and social committee and the Committee of the Regions: Towards social Investment for Growth and Cohesion including
implementing the European Social Fund 2014–2020. Brussels: European Commission.
Famira-Mühlberger, U. (2014). Zur ökonomischen Notwendigkeit eines investiven Sozialstaates. Wien: Österreichisches Institut
für Wirtschaftsforschung.
Fink, M. (2019). Arbeitsmarkt und Arbeitsmarktpolitik unter Schwarz-Blau. In E. Talos (Ed.), Die Schwarz-Blaue Wende in
Österreich: Eine Bilanz (pp. 209–230). Wien: LIT.
Fuchs, M. (2009). Nicht-Inanspruchnahme von Sozialleistungen am Beispiel der Sozialhilfe. In N. Dimmel, K. Heitzmann, &
M. Schenk (Eds.), Handbuch Armut in Österreich (pp. 317–331). Innsbruck: Studienverlag.
Fuchs, M., Schmied, G., & Oberzaucher, N. (2003). Quantitative und qualitative Erfassung und Analyse der nicht-
krankenversicherten Personen in Österreich. Wien: Bundesministerium für Gesundheit und Frauen.
Fugate, M., Kinicki, A. J., & Ashforth, B. E. (2004). Employability: A psycho-social construct, its dimensions, and applications.
Journal of Vocational Behavior, 65(1), 14–38. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jvb.2003.10.005
Giddens, A. (1998). The third way: The renewal of social democracy. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Heckman, J. J. (2000). Policies to foster human capital. Research in Economics, 54(1), 3–56. https://doi.org/10.1006/reec.
1999.0225
Heckman, J. J. (2008). Schools, skills, and synapses. Economic Inquiry, 46(3), 289–324. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1465-7295.
2008.00163.x
Heitzmann, K., & Matzinger, S. (2018). Zur Konzeptualisierung von Sozialinvestitionen auf Basis der ökonomischen
Humankapitaltheorie. Zeitschrift für Sozialreform, 64(3), 363–386. https://doi.org/10.1515/zsr-2018-0019
Heitzmann, K., & Wukovitsch, F. (2015). Towards social investment and social innovation in EU member states? First observa-
tions of recent developments in Austria. Retrieved from Antwerp: https://ideas.repec.org/p/hdl/improv/1519.html
Hemerijck, A. (2017a). Social investment and its critics. In A. Hemerijck (Ed.), The uses of social investment (pp. 3–39). Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Hemerijck, A. (2017b). The uses of social investment. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Holzmann, R., Sherburne-Benz, L., & Tesliuc, E. (2003). Social risk management: The World Bank's approach to social protection
in a globalizing world. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank.
Jenson, J. (2017). Developing and spreading a social investment perspective: The World Bank and OECD compared. In A.
Hemerijck (Ed.), The uses of social investment (pp. 207–215). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kaps, P., Bothfeld, S., Brussig, M., Hofmann, T., & Knuth, M. (2017). Normen und Strukturen einer solidarischen und investiven
Arbeitsmarktpolitik. Retrieved from https://www.boeckler.de/pdf/p_fofoe_WP_047_2017.pdf
Kvist, J. (2015). A framework for social investment strategies: Integrating generational, life course and gender perspectives in
the EU social investment strategy. Comparative European Politics, 13(1), 131–149. https://doi.org/10.1057/cep.2014.45
Leibetseder, B. (2015). Activation in the Austrian social assistance scheme - unproductive pressure and low support. Social
Policy & Administration, 49(5), 549–570. https://doi.org/10.1111/spol.12086
14 HEITZMANN AND MATZINGER
Leibetseder, B., & Woltran, I. (2011). Aktivierung: Ein zentrales Element in der Sozialhilfe und Bedarfsorientierten Min-
destsicherung. In W. J. Pfeil & J. Wöss (Eds.), Handbuch Bedarfsorientierte Mindestsicherung (pp. 65–80). Wien: ÖGB
Verlag.
Leoni, T. (2016). Social investment: A guiding principle for welfare state adjustment after the crisis? Empirica, 43(4), 831–
858. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10663-016-9348-0
Lister, R. (2003). Investing in the citizen-workers of the future: Tranformations in citizenship and the state under new labour.
Social Policy & Administration, 37(5), 427–443. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9515.00350
Lundvall, B.-Å., & Lorenz, E. (2012). Social investment in the globalising learning economy: A European perspective. In N.
Morel, B. Palier, & J. Palme (Eds.), Towards a social investment state? Ideas, policies and challenges (pp. 235–257). Bristol:
Polity Press.
McQuaid, R., & Lindsay, C. (2005). The concept of employability. Urban Studies, 42(2), 197–219. https://doi.org/10.1080/
0042098042000316100
Melinz, G. (1989). Von der Armenfürsorge zur Sozialhilfe: Zur Entwicklungsgeschichte der Armutspolitik von 1918 bis 1975.
In Kammer für Arbeiter und Angestellte für Wien (Ed.), Sozialhilfe: Strukturen, Mängel, Vorschläge (pp. 9–32). Verlag des
ÖBG: Wien.
Mitter, G. (2011). Bedarfsorientierte Mindestsicherung - das Zusammenspiel zwischen Arbeitsmarktservice und den
Sozialhilfebehörden der Länder. In W. H. Pfeil & J. H. Wöss (Eds.), Handbuch Bedarfsorientierte Mindestsicherung (pp. 83–
96). Wien: ÖGB Verlag.
Morel, N., Palier, B., & Palme, J. (2012a). Beyond the welfare state as we knew it? In N. Morel, B. Palier, & J. Palme (Eds.),
Towards a social investment state? Ideas, policies and challenges (pp. 1–30). Bristol: Policy Press.
Morel, N., Palier, B., & Palme, J. (2012b). Towards a social investment state? Ideas, policies and challenges. Bristol: Polity Press.
Neue Volkspartei & Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs. (2017). Zusammen. Für Unser Österreich. Regierungsprogramm 2017–
2022. Retrieved from https://www.bundeskanzleramt.gv.at/regierungsdokumente
Nikolai, R. (2012). Towards social investment? Patterns of public policy in the OECD world. In N. Morel, B. Palier, & J. Palme
(Eds.), Towards a social investment state? Ideas, policies and challenges (pp. 91–115). Bristol: Policy Press.
Nolan, B. (2013). What use is ‘social investment’? Journal of European Social Policy, 23(5), 459–468. https://doi.org/10.
1177/0958928713499177
Obinger, H., & Tálos, E. (2010). Janus-faced developments in a prototypical Bismarckian welfare state: Welfare reforms in
Austria Sind the 1970s. In B. Palier (Ed.), A long goodbye to Bismarck? The politics of welfare reform in continental Europe
(pp. 101–128). Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.
OECD. (2012). Better skills, better jobs, better lives: A strategic approach to skills policies. Paris: OECD.
Österle, A., & Heitzmann, K. (2020). Austrification in welfare state change? An analysis of welfare state developments
between 1998 and 2018 in Austria. In S. Blum, J. Kuhlmann, & K. Schubert (Eds.), Routledge handbook of European wel-
fare systems (2nd ed., pp. 21–37). London/New York: Routledge.
Otter, A., & Pfeil, W. J. (2011). Chronologie der Entwicklung der Bedarfsorientierten Mindestsicherung. In W. Pfeil & J. Wöss
(Eds.), Handbuch Bedarfsorientierte Mindestsicherung (pp. 209–221). ÖGB Verlag: Wien.
Pfeil, W. J. (2001). Sozialhilfe: Rechtswissenschaftliche Studie - Vergleich der Sozialhilfesysteme der österreichischen
Bundesländer. Wien: BMSG.
Pratscher, K. (2012). Sozialhilfe, Behindertenhilfe und Pflegegeld der Bundesländer im Jahr 2010 und in der Entwicklung seit
2000. Statistische Nachrichten, 2008(11), 893–907.
Pratscher, K. (2019). Mindestsicherung der Bundesländer im Jahr 2018. Statistische Nachrichten, 2019(11), 846–858.
Riesenfelder, A., Bergmann, N., Sorger, C., & Danzer, L. (2014). 3 Jahre Bedarfsorientierte Mindestsicherung (BMS) -
Auswirkungen auf die Wiedereingliederung der Bezieher/innen ins Erwerbsleben. Wien: L & R Sozialforschung.
Rovny, A. E. (2014). The capacity of social policies to combat poverty among new social risk groups. Journal of European
Social Policy, 24(5), 405–423. https://doi.org/10.1177/0958928714542732
Schröder, W. (2012). Vorsorge und Inklusion: Wie finden Sozialpolitik und Gesellschaft zusammen? Berlin: vorwärts.
Smyth, P., & Deeming, C. (2016). The ‘social investment perspective’ in social policy: A longue Durée perspective. Social Pol-
icy & Administration, 50(6), 673–690. https://doi.org/10.1111/spol.12255
Soentken, M., van Hooren, F., & Rice, D. (2017). The impact of social investment reforms on income and activation in The
Netherlands. In A. Hemerijck (Ed.), The uses of social investment (pp. 235–243). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Solga, H. (2014). Education, economic inequality and the promises of the social investment state. Socio-Economic Review, 12
(2), 269–297. https://doi.org/10.1093/ser/mwu014
Stelzer-Orthofer, C. (2011). Paradigmenwechsel in der österreichischen Armutspolitik? Von der Armenfürsorge zur
(Bedarfsorientieren) Mindestsicherung. In W. J. Pfeil & J. Wöss (Eds.), Handbuch Bedarfsorientierte Mindestsicherung (pp.
193–205). Wien: ÖGB-Verlag.
Taylor-Gooby, P., Dean, H., Munro, M., & Parker, G. (1999). Risk and the welfare state. British Journal of Sociology, 50(2),
177–194. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-4446.1999.00177.x
HEITZMANN AND MATZINGER 15
Taylor-Gooby, P., Gumy, J. M., & Otto, A. (2015). Can ‘new welfare’ address poverty through more and better jobs? Journal
of Social Policy, 44(01), 83–104. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0047279414000403
Vaalavou, M. (2013). The redistributive impact of ‘old’ and ‘new’ social spending. Journal of Social Policy, 42(03), 513–539.
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0047279413000251
van Kersbergen, K., & Kraft, J. (2017). De-universalization and selective social investment in Scandinavia? In A. Hemerijck
(Ed.), The uses of social investment (pp. 216–226). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Van Vliet, O., & Wang, C. (2015). Social investment and poverty reduction: A comparative analysis across fifteen European
countries. Journal of Social Policy, 44(03), 611–638. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0047279415000070
Weißensteiner, M. (2011). Bedarfsorientierte Mindestsicherung und Sozialversicherung. In W. J. Pfeil & J. Wöss (Eds.), Hand-
buch Bedarfsorientierte Mindestsicherung (pp. 97–111). Wien: ÖGB-Verlag.
How to cite this article: Heitzmann K, Matzinger S. The (changing) consideration of social investment in the
design of welfare benefits: The case of poverty relief in Austria. Soc Policy Adm. 2020;1–16. https://doi.org/
10.1111/spol.12643
16 HEITZMANN AND MATZINGER
